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COLLOQUIUM
NATURAL LAW, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Robert P. George*
INTRODUCTION
The concept of "natural law" is central to the western tradition of
thought about morality, politics, and law. Although the western
tradition is not united around a single theoretical account of natural
law, its principal architects and leading spokesmen-from Aristotle
and Thomas Aquinas to Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King-
have shared a fundamental belief that humanly created "positive" law
is morally good or bad-just or unjust-depending on its conformity
to the standards of a "natural," (viz., moral) law that is no mere
human creation. The natural law is, thus, a "higher" law, albeit a law
that is in principle accessible to human reason and not dependent on
(though entirely compatible with and, indeed, illumined by) divine
revelation.' Saint Paul, for example, refers to a law "written on [the]
heart[]" which informs the consciences of even the Gentiles who do
not have the revealed law of Moses to guide them.2 Many centuries
later, Thomas Jefferson appeals to "the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God" in justifying the American Revolution.'
Most modern commentators agree that the American founders
were firm believers in natural law and sought to craft a constitution
that would conform to its requirements, as they understood them, and
embody its basic principles for the design of a just political order. The
framers of the Constitution sought to create institutions and
* McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the James Madison
Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University. Professor George
gave a version of this Article as the inaugural lecture in Fordham's Natural Law
Colloquium, which is dedicated to encouraging reflection upon the natural law
tradition in law, politics, and civic discourse. The Colloquium is jointly sponsored by
the School of Law and the Department of Philosophy.
1. See Robert P. George, Natural Law Ethics, in A Companion to the Philosophy
of Religion 453-65 (Philip L. Quinn & Charles Taliaferro eds., 1997).
2. 2 Romans 14:15.
3. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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procedures that would afford respect and protection to those basic
rights ("natural rights") that people possess, not as privileges or
opportunities granted by the state, but as principles of natural law
which it is the moral duty of the state to respect and protect.
Throughout the Twentieth century, however, a lively debate has
existed regarding the question of whether the Constitution
incorporates natural law in such a way as to make it a source of
judicially enforceable, albeit unwritten, constitutional rights and other
guarantees. 4 In my remarks this evening, I will discuss two significant
"moments" in this debate: (1) the exchange between majority and
dissenting Justices in the 1965 Supreme Court case of Griswold v.
Connecticut;' and (2) an important effort by a distinguished
constitutional law scholar, the late Edward S. Corwin of Princeton
University, to specify, and draw out the implications of, the
rootedness of American constitutional law in natural law concepts.
I. THE GRISWOLD PROBLEM
In 1965, the Supreme Court of the United States, by a vote of seven
to two, invalidated a Connecticut anti-contraception law on the
ground that it violated a fundamental right of marital privacy that,
though nowhere mentioned or plainly implied in the text of the
constitution, was to be found in "penumbras, formed by emanations ' 6
from various "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights."'7 Writing in
dissent, Justice Hugo Black accused the majority of indulging in "the
natural law due process philosophy"8 of judging. Although critics
would later heap ridicule on the majority's metaphysics of
"penumbras formed by emanations," Black was content on this score
to merely record his view that we "get nowhere in this case by talk
about a constitutional 'right of privacy' as an emanation from one or
more constitutional provisions."9 His focus, rather, was on unmasking
what he judged to be an implicit revival by the majority of the long
discredited "natural law" doctrine.
As far as Black was concerned, bringing to light the "natural law"
basis of the Griswold decision was sufficient to establish the
incorrectness of the ruling and the unsoundness of the reasoning set
forth in Justice William 0. Douglas' opinion for the Court. Black
assumed that Douglas would not dare to defend the proposition that
judges are somehow authorized to enforce an unwritten "natural law,"
4. For a valuable summary of, and important contribution to, the debate, see
Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102
Yale L.J. 907 (1993).
5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. Id. at 484.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 509-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
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or invalidate legislation that allegedly violated unwritten "natural
rights" or substantive due process."' He was correct in this
assumption. Douglas emphatically denied that the majority was
resurrecting the jurisprudential doctrine under which the Court had
earlier in the century struck down worker protection laws and other
forms of economic regulation and social welfare legislation as
violations of unwritten natural rights (above all the right to freedom
of contract) allegedly protected by the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments." Indeed, Douglas did not even
mention due process in his long catalogue of explicit Bill of Rights
guarantees whose penumbral emanations supposedly created a right
of married couples to purchase and use contraceptives. 2
Both Black (in 1937) and Douglas (in 1939) had been appointed by
Franklin D. Roosevelt whose manifest intent was to put onto the
Supreme Court jurists who could be counted on to oppose the judicial
philosophy that had impeded the progressive legislative agenda since
at least 1905. The most celebrated cases involved freedom of contract
and other economic issues, 13 although a small number of cases
invalidated restrictions on non-economic liberties, such as the right of
parents to choose private, religiously affiliated schools, rather than
public education, for their children, 4 or of teachers to teach foreign
languages.15 Roosevelt and other critics had excoriated the Court for
its rulings in cases involving economic regulation and social welfare
legislation, suggesting that the Justices were, without the slightest
10. Id. at 512-13 (Black, J., dissenting).
11. "We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions." Id at 482.
12. Douglas listed "[t]he right of association contained in the penumbra of the
First Amendment;" the Third Amendment's prohibition of quartering soldiers in
private houses in peace time; the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and the
Ninth Amendment's concept of rights "retained by the people." See id. at 484. In a
famous concurring opinion, Justice Arthur Goldberg (a Kennedy appointee), joined
by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan (both Eisenhower
appointees), expounded a due process theory of the case, one buttressed by the
invocation of the Ninth Amendment, which, according to Goldberg, -lends strong
support to the view that the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments... is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
amendments." Id at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice John Marshall Harlan
(another Eisenhower appointee), in a separate concurrence, announced his
preference for a more straightforward Fourteenth Amendment due process theory.
See id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
13. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York
statute limiting the number of hours employees in a bakery could be required or
permitted to work); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a
federal law against "yellow dog contracts" on interstate railroads); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (citing Lochner to invalidate legislation
setting minimum wages for women workers in the District of Columbia).
14. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
15. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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constitutional warrant, substituting their personal political and
economic opinions for the contrary judgments of the elected
representatives of the people. 16 Under the pretext of giving effect to
implied constitutional protections, the critics alleged, the "nine old
men" were reading the social and economic policies they favored into
the Constitution as a means of imposing them on the public. 17 Even
twenty years after Roosevelt's death, no self-respecting Roosevelt
appointee to the Supreme Court would want to be caught indulging in
the practice he had condemned.
In those twenty years, however, much had changed in American
social life, and new issues were before the Court. One of these was
contraception. 8 The development of the anovulent birth control pill
in the early 1960s energized pro-contraception groups, such as
Planned Parenthood, and catapulted the issue into the mainstream of
public discussion. The practice of contraception, which even fifty
years earlier had been condemned not only by the Catholic Church
but across the denominational spectrum (and by such esteemed
organs of the American social-political establishment as The
Washington Post), became increasingly respectable among opinion-
shaping elites and middle and upper class Americans generally.
Protestant and Jewish leaders came almost unanimously to endorse
the use of contraceptives by married couples to limit the size of their
families, and more than a few people predicted-wrongly, as it turned
outl 9-that the Vatican would soon revise Catholic teaching to permit
contraception for married couples who had legitimate reasons to
postpone or avoid pregnancy. People of a liberal social and political
persuasion, together with more than a few conservatives, came to view
effective contraception as a great boon both for individuals and
society alike. The availability of contraceptives would, they supposed,
strengthen marriages by relieving the pressures created by couples
having more children than they desired or could comfortably afford to
take care of. It would, moreover, enable sexually active unmarried
16. Roosevelt's criticisms of the Court have come to be widely accepted as valid
by liberal and conservative constitutional scholars alike. A notable exception is
Hadley Arkes, whose recent writings offer a vigorous defense of the "natural rights"
approach taken by the Justices in Lochner, Adair, Adkins, and other leading
"Lochner era" cases. See, in particular, Hadley Arkes' essay, Lochner v. New York
and the Cast of Our Laws, in Great Cases in Constitutional Law (Robert P. George
ed., 2000) and his book, The Return of George Sutherland: Restoring a Jurisprudence
of Natural Rights (1994).
17. In his Radio Address of March 9, 1937, Roosevelt defended his "court packing
plan" as necessary to "save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from
itself."
18. Pro-contraception groups had attempted to challenge anti-contraception
statutes in the courts beginning in the 1940s. Prior to Griswold, however, these
constitutional challenges had ultimately been dismissed on procedural grounds. See
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
19. See Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (1968).
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girls to avoid the ignominy and other burdens of illegitimate
pregnancy. Above all, perhaps, it would alleviate welfare costs by
reducing out-of-wedlock births to impoverished women.2"
Many supporters of contraception neither anticipated nor desired a
"revolution" in sexual morality. At the same time, most considered
the old moral objections to contraception, not to mention legal
prohibitions such as the Connecticut statute, to be relics of an
unenlightened-even sexually repressive-age.1 There is every
20. The dubiousness of some of these suppositions was not evident in 1965,
though opponents of contraception warned that the social consequences of its
widespread availability and acceptance would be dire. The Griswohl court barely
considered these warnings. In the end, Douglas' opinion rests on the essentially
undefended assertion that the availability of contraceptives is good for the institution
of marriage. But that was a debatable proposition even in 1965. Supporters of
Connecticut's law argued that access to contraceptives, far from strengthening the
institution of marriage, would weaken it by fueling a revolution in sexual mores
leading to increased family breakdown, abandonment, divorce, adultery, fornication,
and other evils. Some maintained that these social pathologies were predictable
consequences of the intrinsically anti-marital nature of contraception as a severing of
the link between spousal love and openness to procreation that gives marriage its
intelligible purpose and specifies its essential requirements (e.g., permanence of
commitment, exclusivity [fidelity], obligations of mutual support). If, indeed, the
question ultimately turns on empirical, and even moral judgments as to whether
contraception strengthens or weakens the institution of marriage, it is difficult to see
how a court could be justified in displacing a legislative judgment of the matter one
way or another. It obviously won't do to say that the invalidation of laws restricting
contraception simply leaves the question of the goodness or badness of the practice to
the conscientious judgment of individuals and married couples. The question, as
Douglas seemed to grasp clearly enough, is whether the availability of contraception
is good for the institution of marriage. The decision is an inherently social one. To
recognize this fact is not necessarily to conclude that contraception is bad for
marriage or that laws against it will do more good than harm, it is merely to suggest
that these questions are unavoidably political. To endorse the political proposition
that contraception should be left to individual judgment is to answer the questions in
a particular way. And even if one is prepared to answer them in precisely this way,
the question remains as to whether courts should have the authority to displace
contrary legislative judgments. Thus, Black and Stewart. basing their dissenting
opinions solely on the denial of judicial authority, could denounce the Connecticut
law as "offensive" and "silly" yet judge it to be constitutionally permissible.
21. Anti-contraception laws in Connecticut and other states had been enacted by
legislatures in the mid-nineteenth century-a time when religious and moral opinion
was largely united in opposition to the practice of contraception. The pro-
contraception movement, beginning with Margaret Sanger's crusade for birth control
and sexual liberation in the early twentieth century, attempted to persuade state
legislators to repeal anti-contraception statutes. When, as in Connecticut, their
efforts in the legislatures failed or stalled, they turned to the courts in the hope of
persuading judges to do what public opinion, still clinging at some level to the older
sexual morality, prevented elected representatives from doing. As Justice Douglas'
opinion for the majority in Griswold makes clear, the pro-contraception parties
suggested that a decision invalidating the Connecticut statute could be based
explicitly on precisely the doctrine which Black would accuse the majority of
surreptitiously reviving, namely, the "natural law [substantive] due process
philosophy" of the "Lochner era." After all, Lochner itself, though in gross disrepute,
had never been expressly reversed. Although most commentators were (and are) of
the view that Lochner had been implicitly overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. r.
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reason to suppose that all nine of the Griswold justices shared this
view. Black, who was joined in dissent by Potter Stewart, opened his
opinion by remarking that Connecticut's law was "every bit as
offensive to me as it is to my Brethren. ' 2  Stewart's opinion began
with a denunciation of the statute as "uncommonly silly. 213 What
distinguished Black and Stewart from their brother Justices was not
any difference of opinion over the morality of contraception or the
undesirability of laws against it; rather, it was their unwillingness to
declare that anti-contraception laws, however "offensive" or even
"silly," violated the Constitution.
Black and Stewart reminded their brethren that the judicial
invalidation of legislation in the name of rights that lack any
foundation in the constitutional text or its historical understanding
was precisely what critics had condemned an earlier Court for doing in
the cause of conservative economic and social policy. Doing it in the
cause of a particular view of sexual morality-even an "enlightened"
view-was, they maintained, no more justifiable. They argued that
because the Constitution provided no textual or historical basis for a
right to contraception (or "marital privacy"), the only ground on
which such a right could be declared is the very ground on which the
discredited right to freedom of contract had been declared, namely,
the idea of natural law-a law superior to the statutory law to which
judges may appeal in striking down a statute even where the
constitutional text provides no warrant for doing so. In their view, the
majority could not escape the problem merely by declining explicitly
to invoke the "natural law due process philosophy" and appealing
instead to "penumbras formed by emanations. ' 24  "Natural law"
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)-a case officially overruling the decision in Adkins
Chidren's Hospital, which, in turn, had relied on Lochner-the Griswold majority
could, presumably, have invoked the basic principle of Lochner while arguing that the
court in Adkins had misapplied it to the facts in that case. Indeed, they could have
argued that the Lochner court itself had erroneously applied a perfectly sound
principle of constitutional interpretation to the facts before it. However that may be,
Douglas plainly wanted no part of such a strategy: "Overtones of some arguments
suggest that Lochner v. New York should be our guide. But we decline that invitation
as we did in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish..." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82 (1964)
(citations omitted). In the very next paragraph he introduced the "penumbras formed
by emanations." Id. at 482. Interestingly, Douglas' original proposal was to invalidate
the Connecticut statute on the ground that it violated the First Amendment right to
freedom of association. He could not, however, put together a majority for that
remarkable proposition.
22. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
24. One suspects that the "penumbras formed by emanations" rhetoric was
designed to suggest that the alleged marital right to use contraceptives is somehow
derivable from the "logic" or "structure" of the Constitution, and does not depend on
any independent moral-political judgment that married couples ought to be free from
legal interference in deciding whether to use contraceptives. But this suggestion is
dubious. Someone who happens to believe that contraception is morally wrong and
damaging to the institution of marriage, and that the legal permission of
2274 [Vol. 69
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girls to avoid the ignominy and other burdens of illegitimate
pregnancy. Above all, perhaps, it would alleviate welfare costs by
reducing out-of-wedlock births to impoverished women.0
Many supporters of contraception neither anticipated nor desired a
"revolution" in sexual morality. At the same time, most considered
the old moral objections to contraception, not to mention legal
prohibitions such as the Connecticut statute, to be relics of an
unenlightened- even sexually repressive-age. 2' There is every
20. The dubiousness of some of these suppositions was not evident in 1965,
though opponents of contraception warned that the social consequences of its
widespread availability and acceptance would be dire. The Griswold court barely
considered these warnings. In the end, Douglas' opinion rests on the essentially
undefended assertion that the availability of contraceptives is good for the institution
of marriage. But that was a debatable proposition even in 1965. Supporters of
Connecticut's law argued that access to contraceptives, far from strengthening the
institution of marriage, would weaken it by fueling a revolution in sexual mores
leading to increased family breakdown, abandonment, divorce, adultery, fornication,
and other evils. Some maintained that these social pathologies were predictable
consequences of the intrinsically anti-marital nature of contraception as a severing of
the link between spousal love and openness to procreation that gives marriage its
intelligible purpose and specifies its essential requirements (e.g., permanence of
commitment, exclusivity [fidelity], obligations of mutual support). If, indeed, the
question ultimately turns on empirical, and even moral judgments as to whether
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how a court could be justified in displacing a legislative judgment of the matter one
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that these questions are unavoidably political. To endorse the political proposition
that contraception should be left to individual judgment is to answer the questions in
a particular way. And even if one is prepared to answer them in precisely this way,
the question remains as to whether courts should have the authority to displace
contrary legislative judgments. Thus, Black and Stewart, basing their dissenting
opinions solely on the denial of judicial authority, could denounce the Connecticut
law as "offensive" and "silly" yet judge it to be constitutionally permissible.
21. Anti-contraception laws in Connecticut and other states had been enacted by
legislatures in the mid-nineteenth century-a time when religious and moral opinion
was largely united in opposition to the practice of contraception. The pro-
contraception movement, beginning with Margaret Sanger's crusade for birth control
and sexual liberation in the early twentieth century, attempted to persuade state
legislators to repeal anti-contraception statutes. When, as in Connecticut, their
efforts in the legislatures failed or stalled, they turned to the courts in the hope of
persuading judges to do what public opinion, still clinging at some level to the older
sexual morality, prevented elected representatives from doing. As Justice Douglas'
opinion for the majority in Griswold makes clear, the pro-contraception parties
suggested that a decision invalidating the Connecticut statute could be based
explicitly on precisely the doctrine which Black would accuse the majority of
surreptitiously reviving, namely, the "natural law [substantive] due process
philosophy" of the "Lochner era." After all, Lochner itself, though in gross disrepute,
had never been expressly reversed. Although most commentators were (and are) of
the view that Lochner had been implicitly overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
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distinguish in principle the (common law) judicial from the legislative
office, as Corwin seemed to suppose. It is true that natural law
thinkers held (and hold) that the constitutive power of humanly
posited law to create (or reinforce existing) moral obligations depends
on the substantive justice ("reasonableness") of the law, and not
merely on the jurisdictional authority of the person or institution
purporting to promulgate it. But, again, this is true whether that
person or institution in question is a judge (or court) or a legislature.
Either way, valid law is the fruit (or, as traditional natural law
theorists would put it, "an act") of both reason and will.-"1
Corwin suggests that an important strand of the English legal
tradition conceives the common law as enjoying a certain superiority
to acts of Parliament. He gives significant weight to the "famous
'dictum,' so-called [of Lord Coke] in Dr. Bonhain's Casem ' ] which
reads: 'And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common
law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to
be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the
common law will controul it and adjudge such Act to be void .... "' In
this "dictum," according to Corwin, we have a jursiprudential notion
which, when allied later (as it would be) with John Locke's conception
of substantive ("inherent and inalienable") rights of the individual,
provides the foundation for American-style judicial review." He
notes that "the dictum had won repeated recognition in various legal
abridgements and digests before the outbreak of the American
Revolution," and cites various invocations of the substance of the
dictum by American lawyers and political figures in the years leading
up to the Revolution.3
A central feature of Corwin's account is his claim that "judicial
review initially had nothing to do with a written constitution."'  He
asserts that the idea of judicial review appeared in America some
twenty years before the first written constitution, and that judicial
review was practiced "in a relationship of semi-independence of the
written constitution on the basis of 'common right and reason,'
Natural Law, natural rights, and kindred postulates throughout the
first third of the Nineteenth Century.""-  He argues that the
"competing conception of judicial review as something anchored to
the written constitution had been in the process of formulation in
answer to Blackstone's doctrine that in every [s]tate there is a
30. See John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in The Autonomy of Law:
Essays on Legal Positivism 195,202 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
31. Corwin, supra note 26, at 262 (quoting what is cited by Corwin as 8 Rep. 113b,
77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610)).
32. Id. at 258.
33. Id at 263.
34. Id at 266 (emphasis in original).
35. Id.
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supreme, absolute power, and that this power is vested in the
legislature."36 It was one thing, according to Corwin, for Blackstone to
reject the idea of judicial review, as he did, in the context of a system
in which the supreme will was embodied in the legislature; it is
another thing altogether, however, where the supreme will is
understood to be that of the people themselves as expressed in their
constitution. In the latter case, as American authorities such as
Alexander Hamilton37 and John Marshall38 recognized, the duty of
courts facing a conflict between legislation (considered as the act of
mere agents of the people) and the constitution (considered as the act
of the people themselves), was plainly to give effect to the
constitution.
Corwin viewed these competing conceptions of judicial review as
clashing near the beginning of our national history in the case of
Calder v. Bull.39 There, in a dispute involving the question whether
the Constitution's prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to the
criminal legislation, Justice Samuel Chase asserted the authority of
the Court to invalidate legislative acts on the basis of "certain vital
principles in our free Republican governments, which will determine
and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power."40
In reply, Justice James Iredell, though agreeing with Chase that the
constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws did not extend beyond
the criminal law, denied the power of courts to act on the basis of the
proposition, advanced by "some speculative jurists.., that a
legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be void."41
Who had the better view? Characteristically, Corwin appeals to the
authority of history, asserting that while Iredell's view prevailed as a
matter of official doctrine, his victory was "more in appearance than in
reality."42 "[I]n the very process of discarding the doctrine of natural
rights and adherent doctrines as the basis of judicial review," Corwin
insists, "the courts have contrived to throw about those rights which
originally owed their protection to these doctrines the folds of the
documentary [C]onstitution. 43
III. NATURAL LAW AND THE GRISWOLD PROBLEM
Does Corwin's analysis provide what is needed to vindicate the
''natural law" jurisprudence Justice Black complained about in
Griswold?
36. Id. (emphasis in original).
37. Id. (citing The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
38. Id. at 267 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
39. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
40. Id. at 388.
41. Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
42. Corwin, supra note 26, at 268.
43. Id. at 269.
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It is possible to read Corwin as supposing that belief in natural law
entails the authority of judges to enforce it when they judge it to be in
conflict with positive law, at least in those jurisdictions that authorize
courts to exercise judicial review of legislation, and, in particular,
where the framers and ratifiers of a written constitution evidently
sought to protect natural rights and insure the conformity of
governmental acts to the requirements of natural law. But if this was,
m fact, Corwin's view, and his essentially historical approach to the
subject leaves the matter a bit unclear, then I do not believe he was
correct. It is certainly true that believers in natural law consider
positive law to be legitimate and binding in conscience only where it
conforms to natural law and, as such, respects the natural rights of
people subject to it. But natural law itself does not settle the question
of whether it falls ultimately to the legislature or the judiciary in any
particular polity to insure that the positive law conforms to natural
law and respects natural rights.' And nothing in the record suggests
that the American founders believed otherwise. To be sure, there
were debates at the margins, such as the debate between Chase and
Iredell. But the questions at issue in such debates involved nothing
like the Griswold problem. Rather, they dealt with whether the
judiciary could, in effect, refuse to enforce laws that were incapable of
being complied with, for example. Or whether courts could overrule
legislative acts which plainly violated "vital principles" that, though
not expressly stated, were presupposed by the very institutions of
"free republican government."
If we see that natural law does not dictate an answer to the question
of its own enforcement, it is clear that authority to enforce the natural
law may reasonably be vested primarily, or even virtually exclusively,
with the legislature; or, alternatively, a significant measure of such
authority may be granted to the judiciary as a check on legislative
power. The question whether to vest courts with the power of
constitutional judicial review at all, and, if so, what the scope of that
power should be, is in important ways underdetermined by reason.
As such, it is a matter to be resolved prudently by the type of
authoritative choice among morally acceptable options, what Aquinas
called "determinatio," and distinguished from matters that can be
resolved "by a process akin to deduction" from the natural law itself. 5
It is a mistake, then, to suppose that believers in natural law will, or
necessarily should, embrace expansive judicial review or even "natural
law" jurisprudence (of the type criticized by Justice Black in
Griswold). And that is because questions of the existence and content
44. See Robert P. George, Natural Law and Positive Law, in The Autonomy of
Law, supra note 30, at 321.
45. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-I, q. 95, a. 2c., on which see John
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 284-89 (1980), and Aquinas: Moral, Political,
and Legal Theory 266-74 (1998).
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of natural law and natural rights are, as a logical matter, independent
of questions of institutional authority to give practical effect to natural
law and to protect natural rights.
Let us now return to the Griswold case. Imagine that someone, say
Justice Black, accepts the proposition that the framers and ratifiers of
the Constitution were fundamentally motivated by a concern to
conform governmental acts to natural law and protect natural rights.
Suppose further that he agrees that people have a natural right to
"marital privacy" which includes the right to use contraceptives. He
could, nevertheless, without logical inconsistency, come down on the
question of the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute exactly as
he did in Griswold. Moreover, he could come down that way for
precisely the reasons he stated in the case. These reasons do not
necessarily involve, and certainly do not logically entail, denial of the
existence of natural law or natural rights. Rather, they constitute the
denial that judges are authorized under the positive law of the
Constitution to invalidate legislation based simply on their (as
opposed to the Constitution's) understanding of natural law and
natural rights.
As Robert Bork, perhaps the leading contemporary critic of
"natural law" jurisprudence, explains his position: "I am far from
denying that there is a natural law, but I do deny both that we have
given judges authority to enforce it and that judges have any greater
access to that law than do the rest of us."46 Of course, Bork's view of
the scope of judicial authority under the Constitution might or might
not be correct. A proposition may be logically sound yet substantively
false. Perhaps the Constitution, properly interpreted, does, in fact,
confer upon judges the power to enforce their views of natural law
and natural rights, even in the absence of textual or historical warrant
for their views. What matters for purposes of the current analysis is
that the issue is itself textual and historical. If judges do, as Ronald
Dworkin, for example, claims, legitimately enjoy the constitutional
authority to invalidate legislation precisely on the ground that it
violates abstract constitutional principles understood in light of the
judges' own best judgments of natural law (viz., moral truth), then, as
Dworkin himself acknowledges, that is because this power is
conferred on courts by the positive law of the Constitution, not by the
natural law itself.47 Any argument seeking to establish the authority
46. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law 66 (1990). Of course, some people, including, it seems, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, reject what Black condemned as natural law jurisprudence precisely on
grounds of skepticism about the existence of natural law and natural rights. The
statement by Bork that I quote in the text was evidently intended to make clear to
those who had interpreted his earlier writings as grounding his rejection of "judicial
activism" in skepticism about natural law and natural rights that he is not of this view.
47. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution, Introduction (1996). See generally Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law
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of courts to invalidate legislation by appeal to natural law and natural
rights ungrounded in the constitutional text or history, therefore, will
itself have to appeal to the constitutional text and history. This is by
no means to suggest that there is anything self-contradictory or
necessarily illicit about such arguments. There is no reason in
principle why a Constitution cannot, expressly or by more or less clear
implication, confer such authority on Courts. It is merely to indicate
that the question whether a particular constitution in fact confers it is,
as I have said, one of positive, not natural, law.
Now, I should observe before concluding that someone who
believes that our own Constitution does, in fact, confer upon judges
authority to enforce natural law and natural rights need not come
down in favor of the decision in Griswold. This is because that
decision presupposes not only (a) the authority of courts to enforce
natural rights, but also (b) the existence of a substantive natural right
to contraception, at least for married couples. Someone who believes
in (a) may or may not also believe in (b). Stephen Krason, for
example, who relies heavily on Corvin's account of the natural law
basis of American constitutionalism to argue for the broad judicial
enforcement of natural law principles, at the same time sharply
condemns some of the leading decisions in which the Court seems
most clearly to have been acting on the Justices' understanding of
natural law and natural rights, for example, the establishment of a
right to abortion in Roe v. Wade.' Responding to arguments by Bork
and others that acceptance of judicial authority to enforce natural law
will likely result in decisions incorporating into our constitutional law
the modem liberal view of morality, Krason insists that the answer is
to appoint judges who reject liberalism and would enforce "the true
natural law."49 According to Krason, the problem with Roe (and, he
would no doubt add, Griswold) is not the judicial enforcement of
natural law and natural rights, but, rather, the enforcement of a false
conception of natural law and natural rights. Challenging the views of
Bork and other conservative jurists, including, notably, Justice
Antonin Scalia,50 Krason argues that the correct decision in Roe would
not have been a form of judicial abstention which would have
permitted the question to be resolved legislatively (on the ground,
adduced by Bork, Scalia, and others that the Constitution is "silent"
on the issue of abortion), but, rather, a decision recognizing the right
Revisited, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 165 (1982).
4& See Stephen M. Krason, Constitutional Interpretation, Unenunferated Rights,
and the Natural Law, 1 Cath. Soc. Sci. Rev. 20,.5-26 (1996).
49. Id. at 25-28.
50. See Antonin Scalia, Of Democracy, Morality and the Majority, Origins, June
27, 1996, at 82.
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to life of the unborn and "declar[ing] legalized abortion to be
unconstitutional."51
I agree with Corwin and his followers that the fabric and theory of
our Constitution embodies our founders' belief in natural law and
natural rights. And while I also share their view that judicial review
itself emerged as part of the strategy of the founding generation to
insure governmental conformity with natural law and to protect
natural rights, I do not draw from this the conclusion that judges have
broad authority to go beyond the text, structure, logic, and original
understanding of the Constitution to invalidate legislation that, in the
opinion of judges, is contrary to natural justice. On the contrary,
Black, Bork, Scalia, and other "textualists" and "originalists" are
nearer the mark, in my judgment, in calling for judicial restraint in the
absence of a clear constitutional warrant for overturning duly enacted
legislation. This is because the Constitution, as I read the document,
places primary authority for giving effect to natural law and protecting
natural rights to the institutions of democratic self-government, not to
the Courts, in circumstances in which nothing in the text, its structure,
logic, or original understanding dictates an answer to a dispute as to
proper public policy. It is primarily for the state legislatures, and,
where power has been duly delegated under the Constitution, to the
Congress to fulfill the task of making law in harmony with the
requirements of morality (natural law), including respect for valuable
and honorable liberties (natural rights).
Judicial review is, I believe, constitutionally legitimate, and can, if
exercised with proper restraint, help to make the natural law ideal of
constitutional government a reality. Courts, however, can usurp, and,
I believe, often have usurped, legislative authority under the guise of
protecting individual rights and liberties from legislative
encroachment. 2 And courts can usurp, and have usurped, legislative
authority in good as well as bad causes. Whenever they do so,
however, even in good causes, they violate the rule of law by seizing
power authoritatively allocated by the framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution to other branches of government (even if that power
could, rightly, have been allocated to them). And respect for the rule
of law is itself a requirement of natural justice. 3
51. Krason, supra note 48, at 26.
52. See Robert P. George, Justice, Legitimacy, and Allegiance: "The End of
Democracy?", 44 Loy. L. Rev. 103, 113-15 (1998), reprinted in The End of Democracy
1I: A Crisis of Legitimacy 86 (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1999); Robert P. George, The
Tyrant State, First Things, November, 1996, at 39, reprinted in The End of
Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of Politics 53 (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1997).
53. See Robert P. George, Free Choice, Practical Reason, and Fitness for the Rule
of Law, in Social Discourse and Moral Judgment 123-32 (Daniel N. Robinson ed.,
1992). I am assuming that the question at hand is that of the obligation of judges and
other officials to respect the constitutionally established limits of their authority in
reasonably just regimes. I do not here address issues of the rights and responsibilities
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Sometimes courts have no legitimate authority to set right what
they perceive (perhaps rightly) to be a wrong; and where this is the
case, it is wrong-because usurpative-for them to do so. There is no
paradox in this. Fidelity to the rule of law imposes on public officials
in a reasonably just regime (that is, a regime that it would be wrong
for judges to attempt to subvert) a duty in justice to respect the
constitutional limits of their own authority. To fail in this duty,
however noble one's ends, is to behave unconstitutionally, lawlessly,
unjustly. The American founders were not utopians; they knew that
the maintenance of constitutional government and the rule of law
would limit the power of officials to do good as well as evil. They also
knew, and we must not forget, that to sacrifice constitutional
government and compromise the rule of law in the hope of rectifying
injustices is to strike a bargain with the devil.
of judges and others operating in regimes so unjust as to warrant subversion.
Notes & Observations
